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Abstract
Colombia suffers from one of the longest civil conflicts in the world, which is
believed to have had several consequences on the country’s economic and devel-
opment performance. This study uses measures of central government deterrence
effort as instruments of conflict to estimate the impact of conflict on children’s time
allocation to two different types of work: housework and work performed outside
the household for poor families living in small municipalities in Colombia. I find
that conflict significantly increases the amount of time children allocate to work.
Both housework, for girls, and work outside the household, for boys, increase with
Guerrilla attacks. However, the later effect is the opposite for Paramilitary attacks.
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1 Introduction
The social, economic and political consequences of violent conflict are tremendous. It can
destroy infrastructure and capital; it displaces people, endangers civil liberties, disrupts
schooling, and affects health (Justino 2011). Therefore, conflict is likely to change house-
holds decisions in several angles such as labor allocation and human capital accumulation.
The later is a fundamental mechanism through which conflict can affect long-term de-
velopment and economic growth. Human capital destruction during childhood is a well
documented mechanism leading to poverty traps, due to the severe long-run effects it can
have on individual and household welfare via future labor market outcomes and economic
performance of the affected children (Becker 1962, Mincer 1974, Shultz 1961). Negative
effects of violent conflict on individual and household’s education level, labor and health
outcomes can be observed decades after the conflict ended (Alderman et al. 2006, Akresh
et al. 2009, Shemyakina 2011).
Schooling and child labor are usually the two options between which parents allocate
their children’s time. Although they are not necessarily exclusive, there may still be
substantial consequences of work for schooling attainment and performance. Several
studies have found a negative correlation between working and grade advancement, years
of completed education and test scores for Latin America (Orazem and Gunnarsson 2004,
Psacharopoulos 1997). Moreover, even taking into account the endogeneity issue, there
is evidence of a negative relation between child labor and school attainment (Boozer and
Sari 2001, Beegle et al. 2004). Then, conflict may have and impact on both schooling
and child labor decisions, if it can change households’ decisions.
This study adds to the existing literature by estimating the effect of armed conflict
on two types of child labor for poor households in Colombia. To do so, I use two panel
data sets that allow me to link households’ time allocation decisions with armed conflict
intensity at the municipality level. The identification strategy is the variation of conflict
exposure both across time and space. I estimate the effect of conflict (differentiating
between Guerrilla and Paramilitary attacks) on the intensity of child labor, distinguishing
between two types of child labor: housework and work performed outside the household.
I use tow different approaches to estimate the causal link between conflict and child
labor. The first one exploits the panel structure by estimating an individual fixed effects
model to control for a possible omitted variable bias 1. The second and preferred strategy
estimates the previous model instrumenting conflict with central government deterrence
measures, this allows to control for the potential endogeneity issue coming from forced
recruitment. Later on, I add a gender heterogeneity level to account for the possible gen-
der differences in time allocation between each job type. Under this last approach, I find
that conflict increases the intensity of child labor. For housework, conflict (as measured
by Guerrilla attacks) significantly increases the amount of time children, especially girls,
dedicate to it. Finally, while Guerrilla Attacks significantly increase the amount of time
boys dedicate to work outside the household, Paramilitary attacks significantly reduce it.
The rest of this document is divided as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature
review, Section 3 explains the data, Section 4 gives the econometric approach, section 5
1Families could self-select themselves into specific types of municipalities (on conflict) depending on
their risk taking preferences.
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shows the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
There are three main channels through which conflict can affect child labor: indirectly by
creating negative income shocks, and changing returns to education, and directly through
soldiering.
Low household income levels have been seen as a determinant of child labor ever
since the seminal theoretical paper of Basu and Hoang Van (1998). This model shows
that child labor can occur assuming altruistic parents if household income is lower than a
subsistence level, i.e. children are used as an economic security mechanism, as reported in
the development economics literature (Dasgupta 1993, Nugent and Gillaspy 1983). There
is empirical evidence relating negative income shocks to increases in child labor (Beegle
et al. 2006, Duryea et al 2007, Jacoby and Skoufias 1997, Thomas et al. 2004). Now,
there are at least three ways in which conflict can create negative income shocks: lost of
property or increased probability of loosing property2, job loss3, and changes in family
structure.4
Conflict can also change returns to education, affecting households’ child labor deci-
sions through three channels. First, education is a risky investment (Becker 1964, Levhari
and Weiss 1974) because of future labor markets uncertainty and the likelihood of young
adult death. Estevan and Baland (2007) develop a theoretical model that shows how
high young adult mortality rates can lead to inefficiently high levels of child labor due
to uncertainty of education’s returns. Loretzen et al. (2005) find that increases in life
expectancy are associated with higher human capital investments. Since conflict affects
mortality rates, it also increases this uncertainty. Second, conflict can reduce the quality
of education by creating an unsafe environment for teachers and students leading to low
school attendance rates, and destroying infrastructure. Finally, conflict is believed to af-
fect economic performance in general, which can reduce labor opportunities for educated
workers.
Although there are some cross-country studies on the consequences of violent conflict
with mixed findings (Chen et. al 2007, Collier 1999, Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001), this
country-level perspective has been criticized because of its insufficient attention to the
impact of armed conflict on households and individuals (Verwimp, Justino and Brück
2009). Using micro-level data for Tajikistan, Shemyakina (2011) finds that the probability
of completing mandatory schooling was significantly reduced for women. Akresh and
de Walque (2008) investigates the impact of the 1994 Rwanda genocide on schooling
outcomes of children, using a difference in differences approach they find that children
exposed to the genocide experience a decline in school attendance and are less likely to
complete fourth grade.
2For example, guerrilla and paramilitary groups use to charge a “security tax” to vast populations
depending on specific characteristics.
3Camacho and Rodriguez (2010) find that a one standard deviation in the number of guerrilla and
paramilitary attacks in a municipality increases the probability of firm exit in 8.1 percentage points.
4Death or displacement of some relatives may induce an “added worker effect”. It can be directly,
increasing child labor supply in the market, or indirectly, increasing child housework. Justino (2011)
points out that households in conflict affected countries tend to replace dead, injured or physically and
mentally disabled adult workers with children, in order to compensate for income unexpected reductions.
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For Colombia, Angrist and Kugler (2008) find that boys labor supply increased due
to the shift of production of coca paste from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. Dueñas and
Sanchez (2007) find that the activities of illegal armed groups increase the risk of dropout
for all individuals, and this effect is stronger for the poorest households. Rodriguez and
Sánchez (2011) show that conflict induces children to drop out and to enter the labor
market too early. Barrera and Ibañez (2004) find a negative relationship between the
probability of school enrolment and contemporaneous homicide rate. However interesting
these results are, these studies use cross-section data, which has the usual limitations.
Moreover, the present study also differs from the previous ones because it studies the effect
of conflict on tow different types of child labor, housework and work performed outside
the household, and separates the effect of Guerrilla Attacks from those of Paramilitary
ones.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use two different panel data sets for this study. The one for Conflict is a unique dataset
from 1994 to 2012, and the one for Child Labor comes from a social program intended
for poor households in small municipalities5.
3.1 Household Data
This data comes from Familias en Accion6, a social program implemented in Colombia
in 2002. This data set offers information about families’ characteristics, decision pro-
cess and expectations, which allows getting insights about child labor decisions. The
household survey data coming from the Familias en Acción dataset includes information
on 57,764 individuals living in 9,526 poor households in 122 municipalities. Although
the surveys were designed mainly to evaluate the program, they collected information
on household living arrangements, economic conditions (income, assets, transfers to and
from the household, detailed family expenditures, external shocks and how the family
responded financially to these shocks). For individuals 10 and older, there is rich in-
formation on education and employment history, type and amount of payments, work
arrangements and conditions, time allocation per day, and expected and desired years of
schooling.
To be eligible for the program, households had to live in an eligible municipality.
Those municipalities were required to have at most 100000 inhabitants by 2002, access to
health services and basic education, a bank, and not be in the coffee zone. Within each
municipality, households registered with SISBEN (System for the Selection of Beneficia-
ries of Social Programs) were eligible7. A random and stratified selection of 55 treated
municipalities and 67 control municipalities, matched on geographic location, population,
5Population not larger than 100000 inhabitants by 2002.
6Families in the program were given subsidies, conditional upon nutrition and health check-ups for
children younger than 7 years old, and gives incentives for children to go to elementary school.
7Given that we are dealing with poor households, this database provides a perfect setting for this
study, since the channels through which conflict can affect child labor suggested by the literature work
almost exclusively for this type of households that can not afford to migrate or take any other alternative
to mitigate the consequences of conflict.
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and indices of quality of life, and school and health structure availability.8 Therefore, it is
feasible to assume that child labor trends would have been parallels had all municipalities
been equally affected by conflict.
I focus on the time use data on children between 10 and 17 years old. The sample
consists of 15314 children in 2002, 15198 in 2003, and 14102 in 2005. Around 53.7% of
the children are boys, 47.9% live in a rural area, 81.8% have at least one younger child
living in the same household, 82.5% of them live in a household whose head has some
kind of paid job, and live in a household with 2.77 adults on average.
The child labor variables used come from the time use data in this database. There
are three types of work: housework, work done outside of the household, and the sum of
both of them9.
Table 4 shows household and municipality controls descriptive statistics. Children
work, on average, around 113 minutes a day10 , 68.9 minutes of housework and 44.533 of
work outside the household but there is a considerable variation (a standard deviation of
148.3, 97.5, and 128.9 respectively). Moreover, child labor seems to decrease from 2002
to 2005, but this is coming mainly through a reduction on work outside the household.
Table 5 shows individual level controls’ descriptive statistics11 . Older children, with
younger relatives within the household, living with unemployed head of the household
are expected to be more likely to work. Moreover, the more adults a household has,
the less it should need extra work supply, ceteris paribus. Attrition is a concern for this
database. Contact rate was 93.8% of the initial sample for the first follow-up, and 83%
for the second follow-up. This can cause problems if conflict is related to this sample lost,
more specifically if households living in highly affected by conflict municipalities decided
to migrate because of conflict.12 However, since more risk averse households are more
prone to both child labor and migrating due to conflict, the estimates presented in this
study can be seen as a lower bound of the actual impact of conflict on child labor.
3.2 Conflict Data
Colombia has experienced one of the longest internal conflicts in the world. It began
by the creation of two left wing guerrilla groups in the 1960s, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) (Guigale et al.
2002). Landowners and drug lords started right wing paramilitary groups, United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), to protect themselves against these groups. By the
second half of the 1980s violence related to the narcotics business had increased. The
guerrilla became involved in this business as well, which intensified the ongoing conflict
(Harker and Meléndez 2008). Both guerrilla and paramilitary groups have committed all
kinds of violent attacks against the state armed forces, national infrastructure, and the
8Most of the control municipalities were towns without a bank, hence they were not eligible for the
program’s first wave.
9All of them are measured as the number of minutes dedicated to each type of work on the last
business day.
10This might be a lower bound, specially for work outside the household because families might under-
report this type of work more than housework, since it can be perceived as more harmful.
11Covariates to estimate conflict suggested by the literature on Colombia.
12A first approach shows that conflict seems to decrease the likelihood of a household being found both
in 2003 and 2005.
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civil population through kidnappings, population displacement, forced recruitment and
homicides (Rodríguez and Sánchez 2012).
Álvaro Uribe was elected president of Colombia in 2002. “Democratic Security”, his
most popular policy, aimed to regain state control over the country’s territory. In or-
der to achieve this goal, military spending increased, expanding police presence to all
municipalities, trying to eradicate coca cultivation, fighting the guerrilla and demobiliz-
ing the AUC. This policy had mixed results, even though the number of kidnappings
and homicides decreased significantly, some of the AUC members formed the so-called
bandascriminales continue to participate in drug production and trafficking and attack
civil population.
The data set used in this study comes from a balanced panel of detailed event-based
data from the Center for the Study for Armed Conflict (CERAC), updated by Universidad
del Rosario. For every event the conflict dataset records its type, the date, location,
perpetrator, and victims involved in the incident13from 1988 to 2012. Instruments are
taken from the Center of the Studies for Economic Development (CEDE) at Universidad
de los Andes.
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the conflict variables and the instruments
for municipalities present in the household database. There are three conflict variables in
this study: total number of attacks, Guerrilla attacks and Paramilitary Attacks. Specif-
ically, the total number of attacks is the sum of political terrorist attacks, illegal road
blocking, route blocking, explosive terrorist attacks, arsonist terrorist attacks, private
property assaults, entity terrorist attacks, armed contact, ambushes, harassing, popu-
lation incursions, land piracy, and other terrorist attacks. Table 4 shows that there is
enough variation of conflict measures both within municipalities thought time.
3.3 Simple difference
Table 2 displays a simple mean difference between children’s time allocation to labor for
those living in municipalities highly affected by conflict and those living in more "peaceful"
ones.14There is no statistically significant difference for the complete sample. However,
on average, children in highly affected by conflict municipalities in 2005 did more child
labor, specially work outside of the household, but the situation was the opposite in
2002. In 2003, on average, children in High Conflict municipalities dedicated less time to
housework than those in Low Conflict municipalities.
Even though these results can not be interpreted as a causal effect, they do show the
difference that might exist from one kind of child labor to the other.
13The dataset is described thoroughly by Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas (2004).
14High Conflict Exposure municipality is defined as one where the attack rate per 100000 inhabitants
is at least the median of the hole sample for a given year.
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Table 1: Child Labor by Exposure to Conflict
Low Conflict Exposure High Conflict Exposure Difference
2002
clabor 129.084 124.033 5.050
(153.963) (152.492) (3.046)
house 73.627 77.712 -4.085*
(97.001) (106.361) (2.083)
outh 55.716 46.404 9.313***
(141.531) (130.330) (2.649)
N 9943 3191 13134
2003
clabor 106.195 105.907 0.288
(142.341) (149.144) (3.206)
house 62.245 56.582 5.663**
(88.458) (85.976) (1.872)
outh 44.085 49.325 -5.240
N 10394 2571 12965
2005
clabor 102.971 115.180 -12.21***
( 144.774) (152.348) (3.498)
house 70.539 73.369 -2.830
(104.683) (105.869) (2.447)
outh 32.525 41.844 -9.319**
(113.690) (127.548) (2.903)
N 9703 2224 11927
Total
clabor 112.726 115.734 -3.007
(147.508) (151.557) (1.866)
house 68.690 69.700 -1.010
(96.873) (100.517) (1.236)
outh 44.191 46.074 -1.883
(128.270) (131.715) (1.622)
N 30040 7986 38026
Source: DNP, National Planning Department, CERAC/UROSARIO
4 Econometric Approach
As mentioned above, this study uses two different approaches to estimate the effect of
conflict on parent’s decisions 15 to make their children work and the amount of time
they do so (measured by number of minutes children dedicate to work in a given day),
differentiating the effects by gender, by two types of work, and by two types of Attacks
(Guerrilla and Paramilitary).
Given that this panel comes from a social program intended to improve health status
of the children in the household and to give incentives for parents to send their children to
elementary school, all regressions have as a control a dummy for the household receiving
this aid, since treated households should be more prone to send their children to school,
this should decrease the likelihood and amount of child labor.
The first approach exploits the Panel setting of the data by using a fixed effects
15Assuming parents decide their children’s time allocation might not be entirely realistic, especially
for older children, but given the empirical nature and the scope of this study, this assumption is not
problematic.
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specification. This allows to isolate the effect of conflict on child labor from that of the
differences in municipalities’ unobserved characteristics that do not vary with time, such
as culture 16. Then, not taking this issue into account can lead to misleading results, such
as overestimating the effect of conflict on child labor when what’s actually making the
difference is something else. Then, this approach also allows to get rid of the possible self-
selection of households into more “peaceful” municipalities according to risk preferences,
which is a potential omitted variable bias that can double causality problem. Families
could self select into more peaceful municipalities due to their risk aversion which also
determines child labor and is unobserved.17More risk averse households would then live
in municipalities less affected by conflict and send their children to work more, since
it is shown in the literature that education and child labor are two possible and usually
opposed ways to allocate children’s time; causing a potential underestimation of the effect
of conflict on child labor. Hence, using a fixed effects approach takes care of this issue
given that risk aversion is an unobserved but fixed characteristic of households.
I estimate two types of models for this first approach. The first one will regress the
endogenous variable Child labor, (Total, Housework, Work outside the household) for
child i, living in municipality m in year t against a conflict variable (Number of attacks:
Total, Guerrilla, and Paramilitary) and a set of individual and municipality level controls:
Cli,m,t = αi + δt + λ1Conflicti,m,t + λ2Mi,m,t + i,m,t
where Cli,m,t is a measure of child labor (the amount of time this child dedicated to
each type of work on a typical day). αi and δt are individual and year fixed effects. M i,m,t
is a set of individual controls such as child’s age, whether or not he has younger relatives
living in the same household, chief of the household employment status, and number of
adults living in the household; and municipality level controls: Geographic, Population,
Institutional, Fiscal, and Royalties. 18
The second type adds a gender heterogeneity level to the former model, which allows
for a deeper study of the effect of conflict on time use decisions by taking into account
the potential effect of the traditional sex roles that still remain in Colombia.
Cli,m,t = αi + δt + λ3Conflictm,t + λ4Sex ∗ Conflicti,m,t + λ3Mi,m,t + i,m,t
Where λ4 captures the effect of conflict on child labor for boys.
The second approach adds instrumental variables. This is done because of the poten-
tial endogeneity of the conflict variables due to high participation of children in war. It
is well stablished that both paramilitary groups and guerrillas recruit children for com-
bat19. Then, if parents are being forced to send their children to do this kind of "work",
16Different societies can have different points of view regarding child labor. For example, some might
value formal education more than others.
17Risk aversion can affect both households’ child labor/education decisions and their choices on the type
of municipality (more or less conflict) to live in. As the literature (See Grootaert & Kanbur (1995), and
Belzil & Leonardi (2007)) suggests, especially for poor households, high risk aversion induces households
to use their children’s labor force as a way to reduce the risk of falling below a subsistence level of income.
18Population, rainfall, an Erosion index, number of Courts, number of Prosecutor Offices, number of
Attorneys Office, Oil, Coal, Gold, Nickel, Emerald Royalties, and a Fiscal index.
19According to Human Rights Watch (2003), over 11,000 children were fighting in Colombia’s armed
conflict at that time
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the exogeneity of the conflict measure would be compromised, and the coefficients would
overestimate the effect of conflict on households child labor decisions’.
The instruments used in this study are measures of central government deterrence
effort: weapons seized and laboratories dismantle20. These have been suggested by the
literature21 on Colombian conflict as being strongly correlated with conflict measures
such as number of attacks. This also holds for the database used in this study, first
stage results are analysed later on. Intuitively, these two variables should be strongly
and positively correlated with conflict variables because they indicate the presence and
effectiveness of the central government to neutralise illegal armed groups’ actions. More-
over, these instruments are believed to be exogenous to child labor, as it’s unlikely that
households decide their time use based on these central government decisions, which are
usually classified and take place in environments not easily detected by the civil popula-
tion. Likewise, most schooling policies are decided at the regional level, and even those
determined at the country level, are not taken by the same ministry than those of deter-
rence effort, hence households’ decisions are not likely to be affected by the instruments
through any other channel than conflict.
The models I estimate here are based on a two least squares procedure. The first stage
regress the endogenous variable (Conflict dummy) for child i, living in municipality m in
year t against the instruments (weapons seized and laboratories dismantle) and a set of
municipality level controls:
Conflicti,m,t = α+ β1Di,m.t + β2Xi,m,t + εi,m,t
The second stage is described by:
Cli,m,t = αi + δt + λ1 ̂Conflicti,m,t + λ2Mi,m,t + i,m,t
Where Di,m,t is the set of central government deterrence effort, weapons seized and
laboratories dismantled for child i, living in municipality m in year t.
Once again, I also add the gender heterogeneity to the former model. The difference
here is that the interaction between sex and the instruments is also added to the first
stage, and it is also instrumented. The first stage is described by the following set of
equations:
Conflicti,m,t = α1 + β11Di,m,t + β21Sexi,m,t ∗Di,m,t + β31Xi,m,t + εi,m,t
Sex ∗ Conflicti,m,t = α2 + β12Di,m,t + β22Sexi,m,t ∗Di,m,t + β32Xi,m,t + εi,m,t
And the second stage is described by:
Cli,m,t = αi + δt + λ3 ̂Conflictm,t + λ4 ̂Sex ∗ Conflicti,m,t + λ3Mi,m,t + i,m,t
20Controlling for geographical variables are included because they determine whether or not coca leaf
can be produced there. Institutional variables are added as a proxy of state institutional presence. These
variables are included because they are not affected by conflict.
21For example Camacho and Rodriguez (2010) use laboratories dismantle, and Lemus (2014) uses these
two as well.
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where the outcome (time allocated to labor by child i) is explained by the predicted values
of the endogenous variables of interest from the first stage.
Table 7 presents the first stage regressions of the instrumental variable (IV) approach
to check how appropriate these instruments are. Column 1 shows the results for Total
Attacks, column 2 for Guerrilla Attacks, and the third displays the results for Paramilitary
Attacks. Panel A shows results for the no interactions approach and Panel B for the one
with interactions. For both specifications, both instruments significantly increase the
measure of conflict. Furthermore, the F-test shows that instruments are not weak, given
that all of them are greater than 10.
5 Results
This section presents the results for both of the approaches already explained and differ-
entiating by work type, and type of illegal group attack. It analyses the results without
the sex heterogeneity issue first, and then it shows the results when this interaction is
added.
The first differentiation adds to the existing literature by taking into account house-
work as well as work done outside the household. This can be done due to the time use
nature of the child labor variables, and it is interesting to study since literature states
that conflict can create negative income shocks and child labor can be used as a copping
mechanism in two ways: children can be sent directly to some kind of paying job or
they can replace their parents or adult relatives in household chores when these later are
forced to work more than they used to. Hence, taking housework as a type of child labor
can help to capture one of the mechanisms through which conflict can affect child labor
decisions.
The second differentiation, between both types of illegal groups attacks, could be in-
teresting to study since it has been well stablished that both groups were supposed to
have different ideologies and operated in different ways.
5.1 Basic Results
Table 2 presents the results for time allocated to labor by children. Panel A shows basic
model results (no IV), and Panel B displays IV results. This table has information for any
kind of child labor first, and then it distinguishes between housework and work outside
the household. Moreover, I use three conflict variables: Number of Attacks (of any kind),
Number of Guerrilla Attacks, and number of Paramilitary Attacks.
Conflict reduces child labor, although this effect is small. For the no IV estimations, an
additional guerrilla attack reduces almost 3 minutes of child labor in general, and almost
2 minutes of work outside the household. When adding the IV approach, the result is
statistically significant both for total attacks and guerrilla ones, but only for work outside
the household. Moreover, even though the sing of the coefficient is the same (negative),
the effect of guerrilla attacks is slightly larger. The fact that this is only significant for
work outside the household could be explained by the forced recruitment: being outside
the household can increase the likelihood of recruitment, then households might be scared
to send their children to work.
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Table 2: Effect of Conflict on Child Labor
Variables Total Attacks Guerrilla At Paramilitary At
Panel A: No IV Results
Child labor -1.280 -2.602** 0.860
(1.129) (1.1182) (5.226)
House labor -0.617 -1.162 1.757
(0.759) (0.882) (4.500)
Outside labor -0.688 -1.459** -0.908
(0.506) (0.558) (1.507)
Observations 38026 38026 38026
Children 20216 20216 20216
Panel B: IV
Child labor 0.861 0.880 14.088
(2.395) (2.779) (35.013)
House labor 2.656 3.034 36.652
(2.881) (3.274) (46.157)
Outside labor -1.833** -2.197** -23.167
(0.773) (0.881) (16.040)
Observations 30178 30178 30178
Children 12368 12368 12368
All regressions include municipality and individual level fixed effects and con-
trols (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the mu-
nicipality level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Source:CERAC/UROSARIO;
CEDE; IGAC, Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi; DANE, National Admin-
istrative Department of Satitics; CSJ, Superior Court of the Judiciary; DNP,
National Planning Department.
5.2 Gender Heterogeneity
Table 3 presents results for time allocated to both types of child labor adding the sex
interaction. This allows to study if and how conflict affects children’s time allocation
decisions depending on children’s gender.
Once again, Panel A presents results without instrumental variables and panel B
shows second stage estimation coefficients. Given the possible endogeneity of the conflict
variables, it is interesting to compare Panel A and Panel B results.
Overall, conflict increases child labor: an additional attack of any kind increases the
amount of any type of labor a child does by 3.4 minutes. However, an additional attack
reduces by 10 minutes the amount of work outside the household boys do. These results
are statistically significant in the 2SLS specification but not in the no IV one.
The strongest effects are shown when Guerrilla attacks are studied on their own.
Conflict significantly changes both housework and work outside the household decisions.
When dealing with housework, an additional guerrilla attack increases by 14 minutes the
amount of housework children do. However, this increase is significantly higher for girls
than for boys. Boys actually do less housework when conflict increases, so girls’s time al-
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located to this kind of job increases a lot. This increase on housework intensity of for girls
may be due to the fact that conflict forces older women in the household to find a paying
job, hence girls replace them in their previous duties. Now, the situation with work done
outside the household is quite the opposite. In this case there is no effect of guerrilla
attacks on the amount of time children of both genders allocate to it, but only on the
time boys allocate to it. One additional guerrilla attack increases by almost 19 minutes
the amount of time boys allocate to this type of job. It is also interesting to notice that
Panel A results show the opposite sing and the coefficients are smaller. Hence, it is worth
noting that 2SLS specifications not only make conflict’s coefficients significant, but they
also change their sign. This can be reflecting the endogeneity problem of conflict measures.
Finally, for Paramilitary Attacks, there is a large and significant reduction on time
boys allocate to work outside the household when this kind of attacks increases. Boys
reduce their work outside the household by 48 minutes a day. Non-instrumented results
show a small reduction on the time boys allocate to any type of job due to these kind of
attacks.
It is also worth noting that not only results change sing and are stronger from non-
instrumented approach to the IV one, but also that results are more conclusive when
adding the gender level heterogeneity. This shows that the channels through which conflict
affects child labor decisions are different for both genders, which might explain why the
basic results are quite small and non-significant. Hence, I am able to find evidence of the
persistence of traditional gender specific roles where women take care of household chores
and men work outside and provide for the household. This is not surprising specially
when taking into account that these are low-income, poorly educated households22living
on relatively small municipalities.
22Only 13.3% of head of the household’s had at least some secondary education.
12
Table 3: Effect of Conflict on Child Labor: Gender Heterogeneity
Variables Total Attacks Guerrilla At Paramilitary At
Panel A: No IV Results
Child labor -0.636 -2.285 4.667
(1.419) (1.837) (5.579)
Child labor*Sex -1.244 -0.593 -7.724**
(1.363) (2.019) (3.776)
House labor -1.233 -3.595*** 3.154
(0.964) (1.198) (5.717)
H_labor*Sex 1.193 4.554*** -2.847
(0.800) (1.081) (3.707)
Outside labor 0.568 1.287 1.471
(0.875) (1.033) (1.767)
O_labor*Sex -2.430 -5.141*** -4.853
(1.578) (1.803) (4.271)
Observations 38056 38056 38056
Children 20216 20216 20216
Panel B: IV Results
Child labor 3.366** 1.526 52.753
(1.391) (2.985) (57.105)
Child labor*Sex -7.469 9.708 -38.315
(5.641) (7.663) (26.545)
House labor 2.703 13.968*** -28.983
(3.280) (5.406) (68.069)
H_labor*Sex 0.099 -8.147** 9.837
(10.128) (3.836) (22.211)
Outside labor -1.432 -1.145 23.189
(1.224) (0.895) (17.006)
O_labor*Sex -9.796*** 18.157* -48.124***
(2.549) (9.728) (8.305)
Observations 30178 30178 30178
Children 12368 12368 12368
All regressions include municipality and individual level fixed effects and con-
trols (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the mu-
nicipality level.. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Source:CERAC/UROSARIO;
CEDE; IGAC, Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi; DANE, National Admin-
istrative Department of Satitics; CSJ, Superior Court of the Judiciary; DNP,
National Planning Department.
6 Conclusion
Colombia has one of the longest ongoing civil conflicts in the world. Moreover, this phe-
nomenon has been well documented. The panel of conflict at the municipality level has
detailed information which combined with a panel from a social program for poor families
allows to study the effect of conflict on child labor. Using a fixed effects approach com-
bined with an instrumental variable one to account for possible endogeneity of conflict
measures, I find that conflict increases the amount of time children allocate to doing some
kind of work, but it decreases the amount of time boys allocate to doing some kind of
job outside the household. More specifically guerrilla conflict increases the the intensity
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of housework girls do, and work outside the household boys do, but paramilitary attacks
decrease this last one.
The present study goes one step forward from previous studies in three ways: by
differentiating between housework and work outside the household, and guerrilla and
paramilitary attacks, by exploiting the panel setting of the database 23, and by adding
the gender level heterogeneity to this setting. I find that conflict increases the amount
of child labor. This comes mainly through increases in boys working outside the house-
hold, and girls doing more housework in municipalities more affected by guerrilla attacks.
These gender differences are consistent with traditional sex roles in Colombia. However,
paramilitary attacks significantly reduce the amount of work outside the household boys
do, which can explain the small results when the gender heterogeneity is not exploited.
This could be explained by parents being afraid of forced recruitment.
These results contribute to the understanding of the consequences of conflict on house-
holds’ decisions, showing that there is yet another negative effect of this issue that should
be taken into consideration when estimating the social cost of conflict and the possible
gains from the end of it. They can also enrich the knowledge of governments to help them
design suitable policies to reduce the negative impacts of conflict on poor households, and
hence on economic development.
This is a relatively new research question and therefore further research, both theo-
retical and empirical, is needed to understand the effect of conflict on child labor and the
channels through which it acts. Moreover, it would be interesting to find better instru-
ments and to address the possible attrition problem that could be making the present
results underestimate the effect of conflict on child labor.
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6. Appendix
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Year
Variable 2002 2003 2005 Total
Child Labor
mean 128.016 106.146 104.932 113.272
sd 153.662 143.521 146.080 148.254
Housework
mean 74.491 61.275 70.994 68.874
sd 99.064 88.061 104.876 97.545
Work outside the household
mean 53.746 44.981 34.022 44.533
sd 139.284 128.591 116.074 128.903
Total Attacks
mean 1.380 1.373 1.006 1.136
sd 3.313 3.317 2.725 2.939
Guerrilla Attacks
mean 1.038 1.034 0.822 0.763
sd 2.558 2.563 2.174 2.119
Paramilitary Attacks
mean 0.159 0.156 0.069 0.114
sd 0.631 0.628 0.428 0.517
Weapons seized
mean 0.255 0.256 0.44 0.356
sd 0.728 0.732 1.049 0.923
Laboratories dismantled
mean 0.349 0.349 0.675 0.415
sd 1.885 1.897 2.364 1.825
Observations 13134 12965 11927 38026
Source: DNP, National Planning Department; CERAC/UROSARIO; CEDE.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Individual Controls
Year
Variable 2002 2003 2005 Total
Children younger than 5
mean 0.849 0.84 0.835 0.819
sd 0.358 0.366 0.371 0.386
Adult labor
mean 0.798 0.801 0.825 0.825
sd 0.402 0.399 0.38 0.38
Sex (male)
mean 0.531 0.541 0.536 0.537
sd 0.499 0.498 0.499 0.499
Number of Adults
mean 2.920 2.799 2.829 2.774
sd 1.483 1.375 1.405 1.368
Age
mean 13.212 13.173 13.22 13.235
sd 2.252 2.235 2.23 2.231
Observations 13134 12965 11927 38026
Source: DNP, National Planning Department.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics: Municipality-Level Controls
Year
Variable 2002 2003 2005 Total
Population
mean 27157.290 26932.48 26978.88 27095.73
sd 21400.180 21343.31 21441.06 21571.3
Total Court
mean 1.909 1.892 1.865 1.889
sd 2.333 2.315 2.26 2.246
N prosecutoroff
mean 0.099 0.095 0.089 0.092
sd 0.383 0.374 0.362 0.369
N attorneyoff
mean 1.288 1.268 1.27 1.265
sd 2.182 2.169 2.191 2.183
Erosion
mean 1.805 1.809 1.817 1.815
sd 0.871 0.87 0.871 0.87
Rainfall
mean 1718.397 1723.764 1712.228 1712.877
sd 890.522 895.242 888.368 887.651
Oil
mean 1.63E+08 1.65E+08 2.33E+08 2.14E+08
sd 3.37E+08 3.39E+08 5.00E+08 4.63E+08
Coal
mean 1.89E+08 1.84E+08 2.56E+08 2.96E+08
sd 1.10E+09 1.09E+09 1.45E+09 2.06E+09
Gold
mean 4.46E+07 4.50E+07 6.13E+07 6.39E+07
sd 2.78E+08 2.80E+08 3.15E+08 3.50E+08
Nickel
mean 2.71E+07 2.72E+07 6.85E+07 6.30E+07
sd 1.47E+08 1.47E+08 3.61+08 3.73E+08
Emerald
mean 1.26E+06 1260728 1.65E+06 1.35E+06
sd 1.07E+07 1.07E+07 1.33E+07 1.17E+07
Fiscal
mean 9.791 9.982 3.049 5.003
sd 20.959 21.485 3.199 12.873
Observations 13134 12965 11927 38026
Source:CERAC/UROSARIO; CEDE; IGAC, Geographic Institute Agustin
Codazzi; DANE, National Administrative Department of Satitics; CSJ, Su-
perior Court of the Judiciary; DNP, National Planning Department.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics: First Stage Results
Variables Total Attacks Guerrilla At Paramilitary At
Panel A: No interactions
Laboratories dismantled 2.635** 2.117** 0.223
(1.007) (0.831) (0.135)
Weapons seized 1.613*** 1.396*** 0.116
(0.280) (0.299) (0.073)
F-excluded 16.800 11.15 1.600
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.207
Observations 38026 38026 39026
Panel B.1:Interactions (Conflict)
Laboratories dismantled 2.737** 2.156** 0.239
(1.092) (0.874) (0.015)
Weapons seized 1.591*** 1.364*** 0.111
(0.296) (0.318) (0.076)
F-excluded 24.570 24.45 1.95
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.108
Panel B.1: Interactions (Sex Interaction)
Laboratories dismantled*sex 0.002 0.002 0.390*
(0.141) (0.139) (0.219)
Weapons seized*sex 0.720** 0.717** 0.352**
(0.344) (0.342) (0.168)
F-excluded 2.88 2.84 4.58
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.026 0.028 0.002
Observations 30178 30178 30178
All regressions include municipality and individual level controls (not re-
ported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Source:CERAC/UROSARIO; CEDE; IGAC, Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi;
DANE, National Administrative Department of Satitics; CSJ, Superior Court of the
Judiciary; DNP, National Planning Department.
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